Pronkina A. THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND // Studia Humanitatis Borealis. 2021. Vol. 1. № 2. P. 14‒24.
DOI: 10.15393/j12.art.2021.3722
Issue № 2
| Pronkina Alexandra | Laboratory assistant, State Academic University for Humanities, Moscow, Russian Federation, alexrivkul@gmail.com |
| Ключевые слова: cognitive boundaries ecological psychology James Gibson embodied cognition Francisco Varela sensorimotor enactivism Alva Noë extended cognition David Chalmers Andy Clark | Аннотация: The article deals with a controversial problem of the philosophy of mind, known as the problem of cognitive boundaries. This problem is illustrated by the polemic between two actively debating philosophical positions – internalism, according to which mental states are localized in the brain, and externalism, which assumes that cognitive acts are not limited to our body. The author analyzes Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s theory of extended cognitive processes and the extended mind, which is fundamentally new for the modern philosophy of mind and has taken on relevance today. It is shown that this concept is based on the idea of subject’s activity, which has its roots in James Gibson’s “ecological psychology”, Francisco Varela’s idea of “embodied cognition” and Alva Noë’s theory of sensorimotor enactivism. The author comes to the conclusion that the theory of extended cognitive processes has a number of deficiencies, one of which is the dependence on external resources and tools. David Chalmers’s thesis that we should not try to neutralize the negative effects of such dependency, but rather try to adapt our practices to the changing ways of thinking is seen as the way out of this problem. © Petrozavodsk State University |
Is received: 24 october 2021 year Is passed for the press: 25 october 2021 year | |
Displays: 842; Downloads: 337;